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Diversity Jurisdiction and Limited Partnerships 
INTRODUCTION 
When an unincorporated association sues or is sued in federal 
court under diversity jurisdiction, the association's citizenship is 
deemed to be the citizenship of its members. In actions involving 
one type of unincorporated association, the limited partnership, 
two circuit courts have reached opposite conclusions as to 
whether identity of citizenship between a limited partner and an 
adverse party defeats such federal jurisdiction. In 1966, the Sec- 
ond Circuit held in Colonial Realty Corp. v .  Bache & C0.l that 
when state statutes prohibit limited partners from being parties 
to actions by or against the partnership, the citizenship of the 
limited partners will not defeat diversity jurisdiction. The Third 
Circuit's recent decision in Carlsberg Resources Corp. v.  Cam bria 
Savings and Loan Association2 disagreed sharply with that result. 
The Carlsberg Resources majority called such a position an un- 
warranted extension of diversity jurisdiction to "hitherto uncov- 
ered broad categories of  litigant^."^ 
The analysis of both opinions was inadequate, especially be- 
cause neither recognized that the whole question results from a 
unique configuration of the rules for determining citizenship and 
two facets of the rules of capacity to sue-the capacity of the 
partners to sue or be sued as individuals and the capacity of the 
partnership to sue or be sued as an entity. This Comment will 
examine this alignment of citizenship and capacity rules as they 
relate to limited partnerships and will identify the policy consid- 
erations relevant to a resolution of the conflict between the Sec- 
ond and Third Circuits on the question of whether the citizenship 
of the limited partners must be considered in determining the 
citizenship of the partnership. 
A. Citizenship 
Except in cases involving foreign states or their citizens or 
subjects, the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts is re- 
stricted by the constitution and by statute to actions between 
1. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). 
2. 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977). 
3. Id. at 1259. This language was borrowed from United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bou- 
ligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 151 (1965). 
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citizens of different states.j In defining "citizen," the Supreme 
Court held in an early decision, Bank of the United States u. 
D e v e a u ~ , ~  that an artificial person could not be a citizen and that 
the citizenship of such a person was deemed to be the citizenship 
of all its members. Although the Supreme Court later reversed 
itself and for a time considered corporations to be citizens,' the 
Deveaux holding was revived in theory (though not in practice) 
in Marshall v.  Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Marshall reaffirmed 
the rule that an artificial entity cannot be a citizen, but created 
the fiction, and raised i t  to the level of a conclusive presumption, 
that all the corporate stockholders were residents of the state that 
created the corporation. In 1958, the diversity jurisdiction statute 
was amended to give corporations ci t i~enship.~ 
Unincorporated associations, on the other hand, were denied 
citizenship as entities because the Marshall fiction did not apply 
to them. Beginning in 1889, the Supreme Court was urged in a 
series of cases to extend to unincorporated associations the bene- 
fits of the jurisdictional standards applied to corporations. The 
first case was Chapman v.  B ~ r n e y , ~  in which a New York joint 
stock company sought to be treated as a corporation. In 1900, a 
Pennsylvania limited partnership argued in Great Southern Fire 
Proof Hotel Co. v .  Jonesl0 that it should have citizenship. Finally, 
citizenship status was urged for a university board of trustees in 
Thomas v.  Board of Trustees. l 1  In every instance, the Court held 
that a noncorporate body was incapable of having a citizenship 
4. U S .  CONST. art. III, 4 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in 
Law and Equity . . . between Citizens of different states."); 28 U.S.C. 4 1332 (1970), as 
amended by Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 96-583, 5 3, 90 Stat. 2891. 
5. 9 U S .  (5 Cranch) 37 (1809). 
6. Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). For a thorough and 
critical examination of the corporate citizenship question, see McGovney, A Supreme 
Court Fiction-Corporations in the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts 
(pts. 1-3), 56 HARV. L. REV. 853, 1090, 1225 (1943). McGovney concluded that the exten- 
sion of diversity jurisdiction to corporations was unconstitutional and should be immedi- 
ately changed by either the Court or the Congress. 
7. 57 U.S. (16 HOW.) 314, 325-29 (1854). 
8. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 4 2, 72 Stat. 415 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 4 
1332(c) (1970)). The statute specifies that "a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any 
State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place 
of business." 
9. 129 U.S. 677 (1889). 
10. 177 U.S. 449 (1900). Although the partnership in that case was denominated a 
limited partnership, there was apparently no difference in status among the partners. In 
that significant aspect it was different from the modern limited partnership. Carlsberg 
Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1264 (3d Cir. 1977). 
11. 195 US.  207 (1904). 
66 11 DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 663 
of its own, thus refusing to enlarge the Marshall fiction to include 
unincorporated associations. 
The result, now the general rule as to noncorporate entities, 
is that an unincorporated association has an aggregate citizenship 
(that of its individual members) rather than citizenship as an 
entity.12 The effect of this rule is to greatly reduce the availability 
of federal diversity jurisdiction to partnerships, labor unions, and 
other noncorporate bodies. Despite abundant criticism of the dis- 
tinction between corporate and noncorporate entities13 and an 
apparent deviation from the general rule in Puerto Rico v. Russell 
& Co., l4 the Supreme Court in 1965 upheld the validity of the rule 
in United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc.15 
B. Capacity to Sue 
As it pertains to unincorporated associations, the question of 
capacity to sue or be sued has two facets: (1) the capacity of the 
entity to sue in its common name, and (2) the capacity of the 
individual members to be parties to actions by or against the 
association, whether brought in the common name or in the name 
of various members. Capacity to sue or be sued in federal court 
is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b).16 This rule 
provides that in actions by or against an individual not acting in 
a representative capacity, the individual's capacity is governed 
by the law of his domicile; in actions brought by or against unin- 
corporated associations in which jurisdicition is based on diver- 
sity of citizenship, however, the court determines the associa- 
-- - 
12. E.g., United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965); Jett v. 
Phillips & Assocs., 439 F.2d 987, 990 (10th Cir. 1971). 
13. See, e.g., Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392, 398-99 (2d Cir. 1964) 
(joint stock company deemed to have sufficient legal personality to be treated as having 
citizenship for diversity purposes; court rejected Chapman's "mechanical rule of label 
denomination"); Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F.2d 355, 371-72 & n.7 (3d Cir. 
1948) (court allowed joint stock company to be sued under diversity jurisdiction despite 
having a member in the same state in which plaintiff was domiciled; court stated that 
the Chapman rule "is itself beginning to show signs of being outmoded"); 3A MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.25, at 17-259 to 265, 17-362 to 363 (2d ed. 1977); Comment, Unions 
as Juridical Persons, 66 YALE L.J. 712, 742-44 (1957). But see Brocki v. American Express 
Co., 279 F.2d 785 (6th Cir.) (accepting and applying the general rule), cert. denied, 364 
U.S. 871 (1960). 
14. 288 U.S. 476 (1933). In that case an unincorporated sociedad en comandita was 
found to have capacity for citizenship because it had a complete lega1,personality in its 
civil law environment. 
15. 382 U.S. 145 (1965). Russell was distinguished in Bouligny because of the problem 
"of fitting an exotic creation of the civil law . . . into a federal scheme which knew it not." 
Id. at 151. 
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b). 
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tion's capacity to sue or be sued by reference to the law of the 
state in which the federal court is sitting." 
Even though state law may give an unincorporated associa- 
tion the capacity to sue or be sued as an entity, this does not give 
the association citizenship in the federal jurisdictional sense. 
Capacity to sue as an entity is a quality totally distinct from the 
possession of citizenship as an entity? Although corporations 
were deemed to have citizenship largely because they had the 
capacity to sue as entities,19 the opposite conclusion has been 
reached with respect to noncorporate associations: "The capacity 
of the partners to sue and be sued in their partnership name does 
not confer a citizenship on the partnership. "20 
C. Limited Partnerships 
Limited partnerships are "creatures of ~tatute."~'  According 
to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, which has been adopted 
in 49 states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin I ~ l a n d s , ~ ~  a 
limited partnership is composed of at least one general partner, 
who manages the firm and incurs the same liability as would a 
partner in a general partnership, and any number of limited part- 
ners." These limited partners contribute capital, share in profits, 
and, as long as they exercise no control over the partnership man- 
agement, enjoy liability limited to the amount of their invest- 
ment.24 One area of firm management in which the Uniform Lim- 
ited Partnership Act specifically restricts limited partners is that 
of legal actions by or against the partnership: "A contributor, 
unless he is a general partner, is not a proper party to proceedings 
by or against a partnership, except where the object is to enforce 
a limited partner's right against or liability to the partner~hip."~~ 
17. Id.; Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334, 337-38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 
864 (1958). 
18. See, e.g., Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334, 338, 341 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
358 U S .  864 (1958); cf. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867,870 (3d Cir. 1968) (distinction 
made between citizenship and capacity in action involving a personal representative, not 
an unincorporated association), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969). 
19. Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 325-29 (1854). 
20. Eastern Metals Corp. v. Martin, 191 F. Supp. 245, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Accord, 
Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 455-56 (1900). 
21. Ruzicka v. Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 197, 111 N.E.2d 878, 881 (1953); Lanier v. Bow- 
doin, 282 N.Y. 32, 38, 24 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1939). 
22. 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 83 (Supp. 1977). 
23. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § § 1, 9. 
24. Id. §§4 ,7 ,  10, 17,22,26. 
25. Id. 5 26. 
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While this restriction is not without judicially created excep- 
t i o n ~ , ~ ~  it is well-recognized and generally followed.27 
11. JUDICIAL PPLICATION F CITIZENSHIP AND CAPACITY RULES TO 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 
A. The Cases from Colonial Realty to Carlsberg Resources 
The incapacity of limited partners under state law appears 
to be the major reason why the Second Circuit in Colonial Realty 
held that identity of citizenship between the plaintiff and the 
limited partners of the defendant limited partnership would not 
defeat diversity jurisdicti~n.~~ Aftirming the decision of the court 
below, the circuit court adopted the rule that, absent a claim that 
the partnership was insolvent, an action against a limited part- 
nership would be considered to be against the general partners 
only .29 
In Woodward v .  D.H. Overmyer CO.,~O the Second Circuit 
made it explicit that Colonial Realty applied only to limited part- 
nerships and that the long-standing rule that the court looks to 
the partners' citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction was 
not altered as to general partnerships. Woodward was cited, and 
Colonial Realty implicitly followed, in Erving v.  Virginia Squires 
Basketball Club.31 In holding that it had jurisdiction of the action 
against the defendant limited partnership by virtue of diversity 
of citizenship, the Erving court stated that "[flor purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction the citizenship of the general partners is 
~ontrolling."~~ In addition to the Woodward and Erving holdings, 
dicta in several district court opinions have recognized the 
Colonial Realty rule.33 
26. E.g., Linder v. Vogue Inv., Inc., 239 Cal. App. 2d 338, 48 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1966) 
(allowing discretionary intervention); Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 
223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966) (holding that limited partners may sue when 
general partners wrongfully refuse to do so). 
27. E.g., Ga.-Pak Lumber Co. v. Nalley, 337 So. 2d 1270 (Miss. 1976); Silver v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 44 App. Div. 2d 797, 355 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1974); Lieberman v. Atlantic 
Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Wash. 2d 922, 385 P.2d 53 (1963). 
28. 358 F.2d a t  183-84. 
29. Id. The district court opinion is reported at [I9641 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7 
91,351 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
30. 428 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993 (1971). 
31. 349 F. Supp. 709, 711 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
32. Id. 
33. C.P. Robinson Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for Hous. Partnerships, 375 F. Supp. 
446, 449 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Sands v. Geller, 321 F. Supp. 558, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Gar- 
field & Co. v. Wiest, 308 F. Supp. 1107, 1108 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 432 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971). 
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In Carlsberg Resources, the Third Circuit specifically re- 
jected the reasoning and holding of Colonial Realty and found 
instead that because 38 of the plaintiffs 1500 limited partners 
had identity of citizenship with the defendant, the district court 
had properly ruled that it had no jurisdiction based on d i v e r ~ i t y . ~ ~  
To hold otherwise, said the appellate court, would be detrimental 
to considerations of judicial economy and principles of federal- 
ism35 and would make diversity jurisdiction in such situations 
"dependent upon the vagaries of state law."36 Judge Hunter dis- 
sented from the majority view and urged the court to follow 
Colonial Realty because, in his words, "tak[ing] cognizance, for 
diversity purposes, of persons who . . . are clearly prohibited 
from taking part in a suit by or against the partnership . . . 
appeals neither to logic nor to common sense."37 
Colonial Realty and Carlsberg Resources suggest two ways of 
deciding whether the citizenship of the limited partners must be 
considered in determining the citizenship of the partnership. The 
first method is to determine whether capacity rules should be 
considered in making the jurisdictional determination. The sec- 
ond is to decide whether the general rule as to unincorporated 
associations applies to modern limited partnerships without mod- 
ification. 
B. Use of Capacity Rules 
i n  the  Jurisdictional Determination 
1.  Identification of the party prior to the  application of capacity 
rules 
The position of the Carlsberg Resources majority can be sum- 
marized as follows: One of the parties to this lawsuit is an unin- 
corporated association. It is well-settled that for diversity pur- 
poses the court should look to the citizenship of all the members 
of an unincorporated association. If there is identity of citizenship 
between any association member and an adverse party, the court 
has no jurisdiction. Once the court's lack of jurisdiction is estab- 
lished, the operation of capacity rules cannot create jurisdiction. 
The dissent disagreed that the identity of the party is known 
when a limited partnership sues or is sued in federal court and 
felt that it is insufficient merely to say that the party is an unin- 
34. 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977). 
35. Id. at 1262. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text infra. 
36. 554 F.2d at 1261. 
37. Id. at 1265. 
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corporated association. The dissent would look behind the part- 
nership entity to examine the capacity of each member to see who 
is really a party.3s 
The fundamental conflict, then, between the majority and 
the dissent on the use of capacity rules in the jurisdictional deter- 
mination arises out of the question whether the court can identify 
the party for diversity purposes prior to applying capacity rules. 
The majority responded to the question with an unsupported 
generalization: "[Ilssues pertaining to the capacity to sue, while 
hardly lacking in significance, are deserving of consideration only 
after the jurisdiction of the federal court has been firmly estab- 
li~hed."~YJ?hat response is inadequate when it is recognized that 
the issue in Colonial Realty and Carlsberg Resources arises from 
a unique configuration of the rules of citizenship and capacity as 
they relate to entities and individuals. First, as to citizenship, the 
entity is incapable of having citizenship (except by reference to 
the citizenship of its members), but the individuals who compose 
the entity do have citizenship. Second, as to capacity, the entity 
has the capacity to sue or be sued while some members of the 
entity lack such capacity individually. Finally, those members 
who individually lack capacity are those whose citizenship would 
destroy diversity. 
A careful evaluation of this alignment of citizenship and ca- 
pacity rules leads to the conclusion that whenever an unincorpor- 
ated association is in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, it 
is because of the operation of entity capacity rules. Because an 
unincorporated association does not have citizenship, it can in- 
voke diversity jurisdiction only because a group of real people 
having citizenship are bound together as a juridical entity and are 
given capacity as an entity to sue or be sued.40 Thus, capacity 
rules are used to mold a group of individuals into an aggregate 
party in actions involving noncorporate entities. Since it is inac- 
curate to assert that capacity rules are relevant only after juris- 
diction has been established, that assertion is certainly insuffi- 
cient to justify denying the application of individual capacity 
rules. 
The Carlsberg Resources dissent's response to the question 
whether the court can identify the party for diversity purposes 
prior to applying capacity rules was an argument that real parties 
38. Id. a t  1263-64. 
39. Id. at  1260. 
40. See notes 4-15 and accompanying text supra. 
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are "those who have the capacity to bring suit."41 Although this 
may be a good argument for "counting" only the general partners, 
it does not explain why the partnership entity should not be 
considered the "real party," since the partnership has the capac- 
ity to sue. Perhaps the best reason for arguing that it is insuffi- 
cient for diversity jurisdiction purposes to identify a party merely 
as a noncorporate entity is that the entity has no citizenship of 
its own and therefore the court's jurisdiction must ultimately 
hinge on individual citizenship. If jurisdiction depends on indi- 
vidual citizenship, it seems reasonable to refer to individual ca- 
pacity rules. While the dissent seemed to sense the rationale,42 the 
argument was never articulated. 
2. Reference to state law 
Presumably because of Federal Rule 17(b), the Second Cir- 
cuit in Colonial Realty would refer to state capacity-to-sue rules 
to determine which members of the partnership are really parties 
for citizenship purposes.43 The Carlsberg Resourses majority 
argued that referring to capacity in diversity determinations 
would mean referring to "the vagaries of state lawwd4 for resolu- 
tion of a strictly federal issue, the jurisdiction of federal courts. 
"Availability of diversity jurisdiction," the majority said, 
"ordinarily should not rest upon considerations of state law but 
rather upon uniform and readily cognizable principles of general 
application. "45 
The majority's refusal to refer to state law, however, is ill- 
founded. Rule 17(b) clearly mandates reference to state law. 
Moreover, state capacity rules are generally applied to identify 
the party whose citizenship is to be "counted" for diversity pur- 
poses in representative actions." In addition, the nearly universal 
41. 554 F.2d at 1263. 
42. Id. at 1264-65. 
43. The Second Circuit never mentioned Rule 17(b). The Third Circuit in Carlsberg 
Resources, however, did discuss the rule. Id. at 1261. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. E.g., Fennel1 v. Monongahela Power Co., 350 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1965); Fallat v. 
Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955) (holding that in determining the existence of diversity 
of citizenship for jurisdictional purposes, the citizenship of a guardian controls and not 
that of the incompetent, whether or not the incompetent is the real party in interest, 
provided the guardian has capacity to sue); Xaphes v. Mossey, 224 F. Supp. 578, 579 (D. 
Vt. 1963); Meeham v. Central R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594, 603-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). But see 
McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876 (3d Cir. 1968) (limiting the Fallat holding to 
situations not involving collusive manufacture of diversity), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 
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adoption of section 26 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act 
dictates that its provisions must realistically be regarded as 
"uniform and readily cognizable principles of general applica- 
tion." 
The majority also urged that using Rule 17 in such a way that 
if affects the court's jurisdiction is barred Rule 82, which specifies 
that the "rules [of civil procedure] shall not be construed to 
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district 
courts."47 Arguably, Rule 82 ought to be a neutral factor in resolv- 
ing the issues of jurisdiction over modern limited partnerships 
since the issue does not entail an extension or limitation of a 
previously established jurisdiction but merely involves a clarifi- 
cation of jurisdictional requirements in a context of first impres- 
sion. Ironically, the Third Circuit, in previously rejecting an argu- 
ment similar to the one made in Carlsberg Resources, had said 
that "referring to Rule 17 only to define the jurisdictional test as 
already formulated would not seem to be pr~hibi ted."~~ Thus, 
Rule 82 in this context is a t  best only a makeweight that reveals 
the paucity of support for the court's position. 
C. Applicability of the General Rule 
A major thrust of the Carlsberg Resources decision was that 
the general rule as to unincorporated associations should be ap- 
plied strictly by requiring every member of the limited partner- 
ship to be "counted" for diversity purposes. The general rule was 
developed in cases where the Supreme Court was confronted with 
the entity argument-that unincorporated associations should 
have a separate citizenship as do corporations. Colonial Realty 
and Carlsberg Resources, however, introduce two additional vari- 
ables not considered in the Supreme Court cases. First, the entity 
argument was not made in Colonial Realty and Carlsberg 
Resources; second, those cases involved unincorporated associa- 
tions composed of members with differing status both in the firm 
organizational structure and as to judicial capacity. 
(1969); Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949) (adopting the "real 
party in interest" test). 
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 82. The majority in Carlsberg Resources misquoted this rule by 
omitting the words "to limit," thereby suggesting a one-sided operation of the rule. 554 
F.2d at 1261. 
48. Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325, 328 (3d Cir. 1955). Accord, Fennel1 v. Mononga- 
hela Power Co., 350 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1965) (holding that disavowing diversity juris- 
diction because plaintiff lacked capacity to sue under applicable state law did not violate 
Federal Rule 82). 
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The Carlsberg Resources majority recognized that Chapman 
v. Barney, 49 Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, and 
United Steelworkers v. R. H. Bouligny, I n ~ . , ~ l  did not address the 
question presented in its case, but found implicit support in 
Chapman for the proposition that  "considerations of varying 
membership status should not bear on the fundamental inquiry 
whether diversity exis t~ ."~~.This  support was based on the fact 
that the joint stock company in Chapman had authority to bring 
suit in the name of its president." This support is inconclusive, 
however, since there is no indication that the other firm members 
were incapable of being parties to a suit brought by the firm or 
that the Court or the parties were concerned with anything more 
than the entity argument. 
The Third Circuit also cited Bouligny as justification for 
taking the "rather hard line" that every single member of the 
limited partnership must be "counted" in the diversity determi- 
nation.54 This reliance on Bouligny is also questionable. Not only 
was the argument before the Supreme Court in that case an ent- 
ity argument, but a major reason why the Court declined to ex- 
pand the Marshall rule55 to noncorporate entities was because of 
the enormous practical problems presented by such an expan- 
~ i o n . ~ ~  The great burden of fashioning a test for determining the 
state of which a typical local-national union is a citizen was only 
one of those diffi~ulties.~' The Court felt that these problems 
49. 129 U.S. 677 (1889). 
50. 177 U.S. 449 (1900). 
51. 382 U.S. 145 (1965). 
52. 554 F.2d at 1264. 
53. Chapman involved a joint stock company that had filed a diversity action alleging 
that it was a citizen of New York. The action was brought in the name of Barney, the 
company president, as allowed by state law, but the complaint failed to allege the citizen- 
ship of the president or any of the members of the firm. The Supreme Court held that 
because the company was not a corporation, it could not be a citizen, and that since the 
record did not show the citizenship of the president or the members, the lower court had 
no jurisdiction. 129 US.  at 682. 
54. 554 F.2d at 1259. 
55. See note 7 and accompanying text supra. 
56. 382 U.S. at 150-53. That burden was candidly recognized: "If we were to accept 
petitioner's urgent invitation to amend diversity jurisdiction so as to accommodate its 
case, we would be faced with difficulties which we could not adequately resolve." Id. at 
152. 
57. Other difficulties were the problem of determining whether the union in that case 
was sufficiently typical or representative to form the basis of devising a new rule, the 
difficulty of foreseeing the long-range and widespread implications of such an expansion, 
and the trouble of deciding whether other rules applied to corporations would also apply 
to noncorporate bodies. Id. a t  152-53. 
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should be left to the legislative branch to resolve.58 There are no 
such difficulties with the issue in Colonial Realty and Carlsberg 
Resources because the citizenship of the limited partnership may 
be determined without tampering with the present definition of 
citizenship. The only findings necessary to implement the 
Colonial Realty decision, identification of the general partners 
and determination of their citizenship, would be extremely sim- 
ple and well within the capability of any court. For these reasons, 
it is inaccurate to assert that Bouligny mandates that the general 
rule must be strictly interpreted so as to require that every mem- 
ber of the limited partnership be "counted." 
Resolution of the conflict between the positions of the Second 
and Third Circuits must include examination of principles of 
federalism and questions of policy. The majority in Carlsberg 
Resources asserted that the exercise of diversity jurisdiction in 
that case would be detrimental to the federal system in that it 
would infringe upon the power of the states to resolve  conflict^.^^ 
Since the same is true of any exercise of diversity jurisdiction, this 
assertion simply criticizes the entire notion of such federal juris- 
diction. While that criticism has some validity, it should be kept 
in mind that there are other considerations that support the exer- 
cise of diversity ju r i sd ic t i~n .~  These must also be weighed along 
with any detriment to the states. 
Another major argument of the Carlsberg Resources majority 
was that there is a powerful and pervasive policy against expand- 
ing diversity jurisdiction because of its detrimental effect on judi- 
cial economy? This argument, however, reduces to one for 
federal judicial economy, because approximately the same 
amount of judicial resources would be expended whether the case 
58. Id. at 152. 
59. 554 F.2d at 1257. 
60. Some considerations that have been suggested include avoidance of local preju- 
dice against out-of-state litigants, encouragement of commercial investment, availability 
of federal procedural advantages, and achievement of uniformity of decision in commer- 
cial law, conflicts of law, and international law. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 99-110, 458- 
64 (1969); Friendly, The Historical Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483 
(1928); Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: A 
Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HAFW. L. REV. 1426, 1445-51 (1964); Note, Federal 
Diversity Jurisdiction-Citizenship for Unincorporated Associations, 19 VAND. L. REV. 
984, 987-89 (1966). 
61. 554 F.2d at 1256-57. 
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were tried in federal or state court. Serious questions of judicial 
integrity would be raised if questions of workload and the size of 
the federal docket were given undue emphasis in making jurisdic- 
tional determinations. To the extent that the argument for judi- 
cial economy includes judges' concern for the size of their own 
workload, it should be disregarded. 
Other policy considerations make the nature of the artificial 
person relevant to the jurisdictional determination. Entities with 
functionally similar structure-e.g., limited partnerships and 
corporations-should receive similar treatment, regardless of 
their denomination as corporate or noncorporate. This argument 
essentially urges the considerations of basic fairness and sub- 
stance over form. Normally such an argument runs afoul of the 
traditions against redefining citizenship to include artificial per- 
sons other than  corporation^.^^ Those difficulties, however, are 
not encountered in affording limited partnerships treatment more 
akin to that given corporations (more ready access to federal 
courts) because there is no need to tamper with the definition of 
citizenship in reaching the Colonial Realty result. Thus, a policy 
of similar treatment for entities of similar structure can be fol- 
lowed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The widespread use of limited partnerships makes it certain 
that the issue faced in Colonial Realty and Carlsberg Resources 
will present itself again, and the question of the availability of 
diversity jurisdiction to such entities will then need to be decided. 
While giving limited partnerships their own citizenship seems to 
be precluded by Bouligny, serious questions as to both the applic- 
ability of the noncorporate entity general rule and the necessity 
of using individual capacity rules to identify the parties whose 
citizenship should be "counted" for diversity purposes suggest 
that Colonial Realty be followed. Considerations of consistency 
and judicial integrity also direct that the identity of citizenship 
between limited partners and an adverse party not defeat federal 
diversity jurisdiction. 
62. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965). 
